Suchergebnisse

Abstract. The doctrine of freedom of contract, viz., that each person should have the liberty to enter into and the right to insist on the fulfillment of any rights‐respecting contract, is defined and defended as an implication of a Lockean emphasis on natural rights. This natural rights perspective requires the rejection of all collective social goal theories, e.g., utilitarianism, and the rejection of objections to freedom of contract which proceed from such theories. Four specific objections to freedom of contract, each of which appears to flow from an individualistic emphasis on freedom and rights, are considered. But each of these is dismissed either for misconceiving the nature of freedom or for involving an underlying appeal to some implausible social goal theory.

Abstract: Freedom of contract is a fundamental principle of European private law. It is also implicitly recognized as a general principle of European Community Law. An open market economy with free competition, which the Treaty aims to implement (see Article 4 I), can only be achieved if contractual freedom in connection with a system ensuring effective competition within the internal market is guaranteed. However, the acknowledgement of contractual freedom as a general principle of Community Law stands in notable contrast to the European legislation on contract law. This legislation may be characterized by its fragmentation into numerous legal instruments which address issues of contract law by a great number of mandatory provisions in a rather selective and isolated manner. Even more problematic are the intrusions into the freedom of contract embodied in the various anti–discrimination directives, which go far beyond the traditional field of labour relations and directly impair the freedom of unhindered selection of a contractual partner in general business life. This conflict between the anti–discrimination provisions and the market economy principle may become even more apparent when the Charter of Fundamental Rights comes into force. Anchored within the Charter are not only several aspects of the freedom of contract, but also an extensive anti–discrimination provision. Directly applied in private law, it might endanger the market economy as the foundation of the European Union.
Résumé: La liberté de contracter constitue le principe fondamental du droit privé européen. Il y a bien longtemps qu'elle est également reconnue comme un des principes généraux du droit de l'Union européenne. Une économie de marché ouverte gouvernée par la libre concurrence qui est envisagée par l'Art. 4 I CE ne peut être mise en place qu'en lien avec la liberté de contracter et la protection effective de la concurrence. Or, la reconnaissance de la liberté de contracter comme un principe général du droit de L'Union Europeenne fait clairement contraste à la législation européenne concernant le droit des contrats. Celle–ci est justement caractérisée par sa nature impérative et par sa fragmentation en plusieurs actes de législation successifs, qui ne s'adressent aux problèmes différents que de manière sélective et sans cohérence. Un véritable danger à la liberté de contracter émane des différentes directives anti–discrimination qui, désormais, vont bien au–delà du domaine initial du droit du travail. De cette façon celles– ci empiètent sur la liberté d'accepter ou de refuser un partenaire de contrat dans les relations civiles en général. Ceci rend manifeste un confl it avec les principes d'une économie de marché ouverte qui pourrait être considérablement accentué après que la Charte des droits fondamentaux sera mise en vigueur. Bien que celle–ci protège quelques aspects de la liberté de contracter, son Art. 21 pourrait se prêter à une interprétation dans le sens d'une stipulation anti–discriminatoire globale, qui, si appliquée directement aux rapports juridiques privés, menacerait le principe d'une économie ouverte fi gurant à la base de l'Union Européenne

Abstract: Free movement law follows the contours of freedom of contract very closely. It prevents public or private parties from interfering with the contractual freedom of others. It does not, however, appear to be understood by the Court of Justice to apply to contractual preferences as such. Thus, the gradual extension of its horizontal effect, culminating in Viking Line, does not represent a gradual encroachment on freedom of contract but a gradual extension of its power to prevent this freedom being restricted. This contractual orientation has liberalizing consequences that are probably economically inefficient, since they ignore the existing preferences of consumers, who do not always want liberalization. Nor can it be seen as a moral liberalism rooted in principled attachment to liberty: Freedom of contract appears to be instrumentally viewed by the Court, as a tool of integration. Rather, this article suggests that the contractual orientation of free movement reveals it to be an exercise in social engineering, seeking to nudge Europeans into changing their domestic preferences for more European ones. Résumé: Le droit de la libre circulation suit les contours de la liberté contractuelle de très près. Il empêche les parties publiques ou privées d'interférer avec la liberté contractuelle des autres. Il n'apparaît cependant pas être compris par la Cour de Justice comme s'applicant aux préférences contractuelles en tant que telles. Ainsi, l'extension progressive de son effet horizontal, aboutissant à Viking Line, ne représente pas un empiétement progressif sur la liberté contractuelle, mais plutôt une extension progressive de son pouvoir; afin d'empêcher cette liberté d'être restreinte. Cette orientation contractuelle a des conséquences concourant à la libéralisation qui sont probablement économiquement inefficaces, car elles ignorent les préférences existantes des consommateurs, qui ne souhaitent pas toujours la libéralisation. L'orientation contractuelle du droit de la libre circulation ne peut non plus être considérée comme un libéralisme moral enraciné dans l'attachement au principe de liberté. La liberté de contrat semble être considérée instrumentalement par la Cour, qui la voit comme un outil d'intégration. Cette analyse suggère plutôt que l'orientation contractuelle de la libre circulation révèle qu'il s'agit d'un exercice d'ingénierie sociale, cherchant à pousser les Européens à modifier leurs préférences nationales pour des choix plus Européens.

This research was conducted to study and analyze the implementation of the principle of freedom of contract in construction services and determine the obstacles to the implementation of the principle of freedom of contract in construction services and their solutions. This type of research was normative legal research. This research used secondary data. Data collection was carried out with document studies and interviews. Analysis of the data in this study used a descriptive method. Based on the results of the study, it can be concluded that the principle of freedom of contract in construction services cannot be maximally implemented due to the existence of standard clauses that have been determined by laws and regulations related to construction services. As for the standard clauses, their nature is obliged to be applied in construction service contracts made by the parties involved. In addition, the Commitment Making Official as the service user is the absolute authority in formulating the construction service contract. Regarding the obstacles to the implementation of the principle of freedom of contract in construction services, most of which came from the service provider, in this case the Commitment Making Official. Many officers do not possess legal discipline background, even though the language used in construction services contracts is legal language. In addition to service users, barriers can also come from service providers, especially from the mental attitude of service providers who are still taking bribes in the conduct of construction services.